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Cognitive skills programmes for offenders such as Reasoning and Rehabilitation
(R & R) have been around now for over 20 years and were developed in part to
address their poor reasoning and decision-making skills. In this paper we
critically examine the theoretical underpinnings of the R & R programme in
light of current theoretical developments and research from cognitive neu-
roscience, philosophy, biology, and psychology. After considering recent theore-
tical and empirical research on rationality, emotions, distributed cognition, and
embodiment we conclude with some thoughts about how to fine-tune cognitive
skills programmes such as R & R in light of this research.
Keywords: cognitive skills; reasoning and rehabilitation; theory; rationality
Introduction
Cognitive skills programmes for offenders have been around now for over 20 years
and were developed in part to address their poor reasoning and decision making
skills (Antonowicz, 2005; Ross & Hilborn, 2004). A guiding assumption of this work
is that faulty cognitive processing and maladaptive beliefs can result in antisocial
behaviour. Such cognitivebehavioural treatment programmes include the Reasoning
and Rehabilitation (R & R) programme (Ross & Fabiano, 1985), a shorter version of
R & R called the Enhanced Thinking Skills Programme (ETS, Antonowicz, 2005)
and a specific cognitive skills programme developed for offenders on probation,
Think First (McGuire, 2005). The structure and scope of these cognitive skills
programmes vary somewhat although all typically include a focus on improving
individuals’ interpersonal problem solving, critical thinking, self-management, and
planning skills. Furthermore, Ross and Fabiano’s original R & R is arguably the
original source of all current cognitive skills programmes and has bequeathed its
theoretical assumptions and practice components to subsequent variants and
modifications. Therefore it makes sense to focus our theoretical attention on its
core theoretical assumptions concerning the nature of cognition, emotion, and
persons.
In this paper we critically examine the theoretical underpinnings of the R & R
programme in light of current theoretical developments and research from cognitive
neuroscience, philosophy, biology, and psychology. Our reasons for engaging in this
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theoretical analysis are as follows. First of all, to our knowledge it has never been
done and any discussion of cognitive skills programmes typically attends to their
practical efficacy in reducing reoffending and the operationalisation of the practice
components. Second, although there is compelling evidence concerning the effec-
tiveness of cognitive skills programmes, the support is not universal (Antonowicz,
2005; Hollin, 2009, p. 9394, this issue). Aside from issues related to treatment
fidelity and the technical aspects of practice we suggest that one problem could
reside in R & R’s supporting theories. In fact, we propose that a more nuanced and
integrated view of cognition may well result in better treatment outcomes. Third, it is
always a good idea to periodically revisit practice models and to update them in light
of current research and theory.
In this paper we first review the concept of cognitive skills and analyse the
different facets of this complex idea. Then we briefly describe the core components
of the R & R programme and the theoretical assumptions used to justify its practice
assumptions. Following on we evaluate the adequacy of R& R’s theoretical
assumptions in light of four current themes evident in the cognitive neuroscience
and judgement research literature: (a) the conceptualisation of rationality including
the concept of value, (b) the role of emotion in practical judgement and decision
making, (c) the implications of viewing cognition as distributed and not located
purely in the mind, and (d) the growing acceptance of human beings as embodied
persons. Finally we will conclude with some thoughts about how it might be possible
to fine tune cognitive skills programmes such as R & R in light of the previous
discussion. We have chosen these topics as they all relate to a fundamental shift in
the way cognitive scientists currently conceptualise human beings: from beings
characterised by intentional mental states that inhabit bodies to embodied persons
(e.g. Gibbs, 2006; Johnson, 2007; Tucker, 2007).
There are of course other important strands of research on cognitive functioning
that have implications for cognitive skills programmes, and more broadly, cognitive
behavioural programmes for offenders. These include work on judgement heuristics
(e.g. Gigerenzer, 2000), decision making (e.g. Hammond, 1996), and problem
solving (e.g. McGuire, 2005). However, in a short paper such as this we have had to
select some of the most relevant and potentially informative areas for offender
treatment and the four topics that are examined in this paper represent our choices.
Terminology and the concept of cognitive skills
A quick glance at the general and offender literature on cognition reveals a
bewildering number of terms used in theoretical, research, and practice contexts.
These include practical reasoning, practical judgement, practical intelligence, social
intelligence, decision making, cognitions, cognitive skills, cognitive processes,
cognitive distortions, perceptions, problem solving, and maladaptive beliefs, to
name but a few of the terms on offer. The profusion of cognitively related terms can
cause immense confusion and make it difficult to be clear about exactly what
phenomena are being referred to by particular programmes and theorists.
Information is central to cognition and in effect functions to reduce uncertainty
with respect to the specific interests of organisms (Tucker, 2007). What this means is
that cognitive processes, structures, and products help the organism to act in pursuit
of valued goals by furnishing it with relevant information concerning its internal
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states and the degree to which the environment is likely to support or hinder its
realisation of such goals. In brief, cognition informs organisms about the nature of
the world (mind to world fit) while motivation seeks to change the world in light of
organisms’ goals and interests (world to mind fit  Audi, 2006). Thus, cognition is a
tool utilised by individuals to achieve their goals and is intimately linked to
reasoning and evaluation processes. In light of these observations, a useful way of
conceptualising cognition in the offending domain is in terms of the distinction
between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. Practical reasoning involves
judgements concerning an individual’s goals and the best way to effectively achieve
them through coordinated action. While theoretical reasoning is concerned with the
truth or falsehood of specific assertions. Robert Audi has captured the difference
nicely with his suggestion that ‘Practical reasons might be said to be reasons for
acting; theoretical reasons might be described as reasons for believing’ (Audi, 2006,
p. 1). In actuality, cognitive skills training involves both types of reasoning but the
emphasis is ultimately on practical reasoning because of its close connection to
individuals’ goals and subsequent actions. After all, the aim is to get offenders to act
differently and any changes in their beliefs are only useful in so far as they result in
prosocial actions and functioning. From this perspective: judgement refers to an
evaluation of the factual basis of actions and the worth of the person’s overall aims
or values, decision refers to the actual selection of a goal and the most efficient means
intended to achieve it, and practical reasoning is best construed as a general term
referring to all of the cognitive/evaluative processes utilised to assess the adequacy of
beliefs and values, to construct an efficient plan designed to achieve individuals’
goals, and to evaluate its overall effectiveness. This is similar to Wagner and
Sternberg’s assertion that practical intelligence enables individuals to solve poorly
defined problems in an adaptive manner (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985).
The R & R cognitive skills programme
In our explication of the R & R cognitive skills programme we draw from a number
of publications by Ross and Fabiano, although we treat the original 1985 publication
as the most comprehensive source (Antonowicz & Ross, 2005; Ross & Fabiano, 1985;
Ross, Fabiano, & Ross, 1989; Ross & Hilborn, 2004).
In their seminal publication Ross and Fabiano (1985) review evidence from
research that indicates offenders frequently exhibit a variety of specific cognitive and
behavioural deficits that are implicated in their offending behaviour. They conclude
that the strongest evidence is for deficits in social cognition, particularly inter-
personal problem-solving and social perspective taking. Ross and Fabiano argue that
an analysis of successful and unsuccessful offender treatment programmes indicates
that attention to cognitive processes appears to be an essential component of
effective treatment and reduced recidivism. They state that despite the methodolo-
gical shortcomings and gaps in knowledge concerning the relationship between
cognition and crime it is possible to assert that: (a) offenders have arrested
development in many cognitive skills making it difficult for them to behave in a
pro-social way; (b) not all offenders show inadequate cognitive development; and (c)
the cognitive component in many interventions for offenders may have been
responsible for actually promoting therapeutic change. Ross and Fabiano take
care to stress that cognitive deficits in offenders are not necessarily causes of crime
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but are implicated in some respects and therefore ought to be a treatment target; in
other words, such deficits put people at risk for committing crimes. The following
deficits are described by Ross and Fabiano as evident in offenders:
. Impulsiveness: failure to learn to use reflection and reasoning to guide
behaviour.
. Action oriented rather than reflective.
. Concrete thinking rather than abstract thinking.
. Limited imagination: reducing the ability to generate alternative solutions.
. Rigidity: causing offender to persist in behaviour that doesn’t work.
. Egocentricity: affecting interpersonal situations, not allowing role-taking and
social perspective taking.
. Limited inferential thinking: inability to recognise the thoughts, feelings and
motives of others.
. Inability to judge nuances and deeper motives of social interactions, judging
things on appearances only.
. Problem recognition: inability to identify potential problems when people
interact.
. Solution generation: inability to think of alternative solutions to problems.
. Poor consequential thinking: inability to consider consequences of such
solutions.
. Means-ends deficits: inability to conceptualise step-by-step means-end problem
solving.
. Causal blindness: inability to see cause and effect in behaviour of oneself and
others.
Ross and Fabiano state that social cognitive skills are learned and poverty, lack of
stimulation, and novelty can restrict cognitive development and make it harder for
individuals to lead prosocial and personally satisfying lives. Based on a review of the
evidence they specifically propose that poverty encourages concrete survival skills,
impulsivity, and aggression and is likely to foster all the cognitive deficits listed above
rather than a pro-social, reasoned outlook. In an attempt to explain these findings
Ross and Fabiano draw heavily from social learning theory (Bandura, 1976, 1986)
and argue that cognitive processes mediate the interpretation of environmental
events and that social learning experiences influence how offenders think about
themselves and in turn how they perceive and react to their environment. They note
the importance of focusing not just on what a person thinks and how this has
developed but also on how he thinks  skills used to perceive the world: to attend
carefully, to assess accurately, to consider fully, to reason logically, to judge rationally
and to integrate information thoroughly.
On the basis of the cognitive deficits noted above and research undertaken over
four decades Ross and Ross (1995) have developed a comprehensive, multifaceted,
manualised programme for teaching core cognitive skills and values, what has been
termed the R & R cognitive skills programme. In brief typical components of R & R
are as follows (taken from Antonowicz, 2005):
. Self-control. Offenders learn how to use various techniques to control their
emotions when formulating plans of action.
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. Meta-cognition. Offenders are taught to reflect on and to critically evaluate
their own thinking processes.
. Social skills. Offenders are taught basic social skills such as responding to
criticisms, negotiating, etc.
. Interpersonal problem-solving skills. There is a focus on equipping individuals
with the skills required to analyse problems, understand other people’s
perspectives and values, and to take this into account when acting.
. Creative thinking. Offenders are taught how to think in more flexible ways.
. Critical reasoning. Offenders learn how to think in logical and objective ways.
. Social perspective-taking. Helping offenders to develop empathy through
consideration of other people’s viewpoints.
. Values enhancement. The primary aim in this module is to teach offenders to
think in a less egocentric way.
. Emotional management. Offenders are taught how to avoid and manage
excessive emotional arousal from impairing functioning.
. Helper therapy. Encourage offenders to act in prosocial ways by helping others
in need.
In brief, it is clear from the above brief description of R & R that a major emphasis is
on teaching offenders to think in more logical and objective ways about their own
and other people’s behaviour. Emotions tend to be mentioned as possible sources of
disruption and there is an implication that cognition ought to be construed primarily
in terms of analytical, objective thinking. With respect to what constitutes rational or
logical thinking, it is viewed as thinking that is responsive to the relevant facts
associated with a problem, does not contain contradictions, and seeks to promote
goals in an efficient and timely way. Little is said about the role of rationality in
appraising the inherent value of goals other than with respect to moral values (e.g. the
interests and welfare of others). Furthermore, the aim is to transform offenders into
persons who are invested in the core interests of others rather than simply their own
need and concerns. We will return to these themes later on but for now will simply
point out that the value component of R & R appears to revolve around converting
offenders to other’s points of view and there is no mention of seeking to establish
what is of value to the offender and using their core commitments to motivate them
to change their antisocial behaviour.
Theoretical evaluation of the R & R programme
In our evaluation of the theoretical assumptions underpinning R & R we have drawn
upon a wide range of literature from cognitive neuroscience (e.g. Gibbs, 2006; Tucker,
2007), psychology (e.g. Baron, 2000; Hammond, 2007; Mennin & Farach, 2007),
philosophy (e.g. Audi, 2006; Johnson, 2007; Kraut, 2007; Thiele, 2006), and biology
(e.g. Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003; Sterelny, 2003). The literature on
rationality and practical reasoning is immense and cannot possibly be reviewed in a
paper such as this. However, we have attempted to focus on recent books and papers
that summarise their respective fields and therefore are reasonably confident that our
comments reflect contemporary perspectives on cognition and practical reasoning.
Furthermore, our analysis is based on the emerging conceptualisation of cognition as
action and therefore as ‘a continuous process of attending to various aspects of our
Psychology, Crime & Law 169
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
01
 1
7 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
experience and putting them to use as part of inquiry’ (Johnson, 2007, p. 91). In
other words, cognitive processes are best conceptualised as emerging from the
dynamic relationship between the embodied person and their environment and
cognition does not exist as a separate ‘rational faculty’ in the mind. The mind
arguably evolved to control aspects of action and goal pursuit, and cognition is
intimately involved in this task by virtue of its capacity to process information and
provide feedback on the factors relevant to goal pursuit and achievement (Gibbs,
2006; Sterelny, 2003) We will discuss this issue in greater depth later in the paper.
Conception of rationality
The treatment of offenders is ultimately intended to promote prosocial actions and
to deter them from engaging in actions that harm other people. In order to achieve
this aim it is arguably necessary to help such individuals to make better judgements
about what goals are acceptable and how best to achieve them. The ability to make
good judgements about worthwhile goals and adaptive means to realise them
requires the presence of a range of additional cognitive and adaptive skills including:
identification of primary values, knowledge of the actions that actually reflect or
constitute such primary values or ends, (e.g. what intimacy actually consists of 
sharing feelings, spending time together, etc.), the capacity to form appropriate goals
and embed them in coordinated plans that increase a person’s chance of engaging in
valued outcomes and activities (e.g. knowing the steps and norms associated with
courtship behaviour  thereby increasing the chancing of experiencing intimacy), the
knowledge to implement a plan and to manage potentially disruptive events or
internal states, and finally the capacity to reflect on the various phases of practical
reasoning in order to learn from experience.
The skills outlined above demonstrate a number of features of rationality. First,
individuals should be able to think in a logical manner and to identify and remedy
contradictory or inconsistent arguments and thinking. Second, it is necessary to
be able to evaluate the evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of a belief when
deciding on a course of action. Failure to do this is likely to result in maladaptive
consequences for the person concerned. Third, individuals have to be able to
effectively coordinate their various goals and the means selected to realise them in
ways that reflect their priorities and also ensure they are mutually achievable. Finally
and most crucially, individuals need to be able to evaluate the value of their final
ends (primary values) and to establish whether or not they are worthy of pursuit.
Failure to do this may well result in action plans that demonstrate coherency and
efficiency but lack value and therefore result in wasted efforts and even lives.
An examination of the theoretical assumptions of the R & R evident in its
treatment components and supporting literature indicates that the conception of
rationality (seemingly) presupposed by it addresses the normative demands of logical
consistency; efficient means end thinking, and objective evaluation of evidence.
However, even in the latest iteration of the R & R theory manual (Porporino &
Fabiano, 2002) there is no attention given to the appraisal of the values associated
with a person’s final ends (i.e. ends that are ultimate and represent his core
commitments concerning what is really worthwhile in life). It is not clear why this is
the case but it may be that by virtue of its reliance on a narrow conception of
rationality, values are simply viewed as individual preferences (this is the default view
170 T. Ward and C. Nee
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apparent in much psychological and social science research  Taylor, 2006). There are
significant problems with a desire or preference conception of value although we
do not have the space to systematically outline them here (see Kraut, 2007; Taylor,
2006). But in short, it makes conceptions of final ends (primary values or
commitments) subjective and does not allow for the possibility that certain
experiences and outcomes may be bad for individuals despite the fact they desire
them. This is because people may acquire distorted desires due to histories of
deprivation, abuse, or exposure to faulty modelling and may not possess the self-
knowledge or the emotional competence required to respond appropriately to
interpersonal situations and opportunities. A more defensible conception of value
that is consistent with psychological research on well-being and quality of life defines
values as those experiences, situations or activities that are inherently beneficial to
people and result in a significant degree of well-being (Griffin, 1996; Kraut, 2007).
Whatever the reasons for the neglect of prudential values in R & R (i.e. related to
personal well-being rather than moral values) it is apparent that this influential
cognitive skills treatment programme is silent on the question of the nature of values
and is not able to provide a comprehensive understanding of rationality nor
guidance for therapists seeking to attune offenders to objectively worthwhile goals
and life plans (see Ward & Maruna, 2007).
A second issue concerns the role of universal principles and situational factors in
practical reasoning. In the sphere of human action, principles are general rules that
cover a range of situations that are considered to pose significant problems and
therefore require a systematic and rational response. Rules effectively prioritise
relevant values and inform people what to do in specific situations, for example when
conducting a scientific experiment or when confronted with a personally important
situation such as deciding what job to take. There are different types of rules
covering the multiple domains of human life such as knowledge generation, personal
well-being, morality, and social customs (Goldman, 2002). In each case a rule states
priorities, and helps people to decide on a course of action. For example, the R & R
module of critical thinking teaches offenders to evaluate the evidence for a belief
before committing themselves to a course of action. Typically in this situation a
knowledge generating rule will specify what constitutes good evidence and states that
choices that reflect sound belief formation should be privileged over beliefs that are
ill considered. There are also likely to be rules concerning logical thinking, effective
planning, and problem solving. The other modules also contain rules that aim to
provide general guidance for offenders in the various spheres of their lives such as
social relationships and mood management. The crucial point is that rules are
typically introduced as abstract, universal in scope and applicable in multiple
situations.
In recent years there has been considerable discussion on the nature of general
rules and experience in human judgement and a number of researchers have argued
that rules on their own do not have the resources to provide individuals with
appropriate guidance when making decisions (e.g. Goldman, 2002; Thiele, 2006).
The arguments are empirical and theoretical. The theoretical arguments are based on
the fact that problem situations are far too complex and nuanced to be adequately
captured by a set of abstract rules. It is claimed that there are important relevant
differences that threaten the validity of a general rule and that at best rules are only
rules of thumbs that serve to summarise the insights that experience has bequeathed
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us. This position is nicely captured by Thiele who states that in the decision making
process the ‘rules and principles invoked are, as often as not, post factor
rationalizations of intuited values’ (Thiele, 2006, p. 71). In other words when
making judgements individuals do not necessarily go through a process of sustained
reflection and logical analysis but often rely on the immediate perception of
situations and more intuitive processes.
The empirical case for the role of contextual features and intuitive factors is
evident in the work by judgement and expertise researchers who argue that
individuals who are experienced with managing certain tasks or problems tend to
rely on the presence of salient cues to quickly arrive at an assessment of a problem
and its possible solution (see Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Hammond, 1996).
Compared to less skilled individuals, experts (or those with significantly greater
experience) are able to perceive meaningful, complex patterns in a particular
domain. They have enhanced short and long-term memory capabilities for relevant
material and appear to analyse problems in a conceptually meaningful way rather
than on the basis of surface features as novices might do. This may be a result
of extensive knowledge in a particular domain (Regehr & Norman, 1996). The
presence of such coherent and rich knowledge structures makes it easier for more
experienced decision makers to rapidly develop effective solutions and plans to
solve a problem. This may be due to the fact that knowledge is stored as scripts, and
once activated, results in automatic rapid information processing and decision
making. This type of decision-making has been noticed specifically in the offender
world in sex offenders (Ward & Hudson, 2000) and burglars (Nee & Meenaghan,
2006).
The relevance for our analysis of R & R and offenders of the above arguments
and research is that by virtue of having been around in the world for some
time offenders are likely to possess areas of expertise, or at the very least, rich
repositories of experience that will inform their judgements and decision making.
Some of this can be usefully recruited in the process of rehabilitation while
offence related knowledge may need to be circumvented, perhaps by encouraging
offenders to engage in conscious analysis of situations (Nee & Meenaghan, 2006).
In any event, the aim will be to eventually facilitate the use of perceptional like,
intuitive decision making that capitalises on emotions (see below) and the situational
cues embedded in problem situations to reach effective decisions. Furthermore,
the fact that rules or principles do not capture the complexity of problem situations
means that rehabilitation programmes need to fine tune their modules to respond
to the unique features of offenders lives and encourage them not to overuse logical
rules, procedures and strategies. While it is not clear that R & R necessarily falls
into the trap of overemphasising principles, and rules, an examination of the
content of the modules frequently used does suggest a rule-based conception of
rationality.
In summary, the conception of rationality apparently underpinning R & R
cognitive skills programmes seems to be unduly narrow, does not work with a
satisfactory definition of values, relies too heavily on abstract rules and principles,
and is not sensitive enough to the contextual dependence of much human judgement
and decision making.
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Role of emotion
The role of emotion in offender decision-making and behaviour has been given very
little emphasis in R & R. Overlooked in the original text (Ross & Fabiano, 1985),
emotion management was given 5 out of the total 95 hours in the manualised
programme after piloting indicated a need for its inclusion (Ross, Fabiano, & Ross,
1989). Emotion is treated in the traditional cognitivebehavioural sense as a separate
from cognition, but as we shall see in the following paragraphs, there are strong
reasons to believe that the role of emotion is central to and inextricable from
decision-making processes and it makes sense that this development is taken on
board in future work with offenders.
There has been an explosion of theoretical and empirical research work on
emotion and its psychological significance over the last 20 years or so, much of it of
interest to forensic practitioners (see Day, 2009, p. 119130, this issue). Emotions are
complex phenomena involving multiple systems that are loosely associated but may
occur on their own (Mennin & Farach, 2007) and involve physiological responses
(e.g. heart rate, blood pressure), behavioural responses (facial displays and motor
actions such as avoidance or escape), and subjective responses (e.g. feelings, verbally
mediated thought).
There are four themes apparent in this research that are of particular relevance
for our evaluation of the R & R: (a) emotions function to integrate and motivate
action (Solomon, 2007; Tucker, 2007), (b) emotions reflect value judgements and
track value (Helm, 2002; Oddie, 2005), (c) attending to emotion can improve
judgement (Johnson, 2007; Thiele, 2006), and (d) emotional competence consists of a
number of specific skills (Saarni, 1999). We will briefly discuss each of these themes
and then consider how well the R & R measures up with respect to them.
First, emotions serve multiple functions and represent action tendencies that have
evolved to enable organism to avert threats, achieve goals and to deal with
interpersonal problems in adaptive ways (Mennin & Farach, 2007). According to
Pennington, a major function of the emotional system is, ‘ . . . to allow goals and
values to influence both perception and action selection rapidly and to adjust
motivational state to fit changing environmental circumstances’ (Pennington, 2002,
p. 79). In other words, emotional states and their associated values and motives
orient the organism to its internal and external environment and enable it to deal
with problems in a flexible and timely manner.
Second, emotions are inherently evaluative and are arguably centrally involved in
human beings’ experience of meaning. According to Johnson:
‘ . . . every emotional response is part of a process in which there is some appraisal of how
a given emotionally competent stimulus stands in relation to the potential well-being of
the organism. Our emotional responses are based on both our nonconscious and
conscious assessments of the possible harm, nurturance, or enhancement that a given
situation may bring to our lives.’ (Johnson, 2007, p. 60).
Emotions often arise spontaneously and immediately orient us to actual or possible
threats or benefits in our lives and press us to respond to the situations that evoke
them. In other words, emotions function as useful (and typically reliable) indicators
of experiences of the ‘good’, of what is perceived to be valuable; but they are not
definitive in this sense. On some occasions it may be appropriate to reflect on the
emotional experience and its various components and inquire whether or not the
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values inherent in the situation are really worthwhile, or more accurately, whether
the appearance of value is confirmed on closer examination (Helm, 2002; Oddie,
2005).
Third, research on the role of emotion on judgement suggests that it can have
both positive and disruptive effects (Damasio, 1994). A lack of emotional
competence can mean that individuals struggle to deal adaptively with their
problems. This could be due to the presence of distorted desires (e.g. seeking to
dominate others) resulting from impoverished learning histories and opportunities.
Possessing distorted desires would mean that a person seeks certain goals that are
problematic and is more inclined to attribute value to specific experiences or
outcome (e.g. dominating a woman) when in fact there is disvalue (e.g. harmful
consequences). Problematic emotions are at least partly caused by incorrect
judgements of value and occur when a person encounters situations that support
or frustrate the achievement of the outcome in question. Alternatively a person may
not have the skills to manage specific types of emotions, for example anger, and
become easily disinhibited when experiencing particularly intense feelings (see
below). An example of the adaptive role of emotions on judgement tasks is well
captured in recent study by Damasio and his colleagues (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel,
& Damasio, 1997). In this study participants with bilateral damage of the
ventromedial sector of the pre-frontal cortex failed to demonstrate galvanic skin
responses when engaged in a gambling task. The result was that their judgement was
particularly poor and exhibited high levels of inappropriate risk taking. Somatic
markers such as a galvanic skin response (GSR) in normal participants appeared to
function as a nonconscious cue that a particular card choice was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and
facilitated sound judgement. In other words, emotions help people to make better
judgements in some situations (Bechara et al., 1997).
Fourth, emotional competence is basically the application of self-regulation
processes to the emotional domain and consists of at least eight sets of skills (Saarni,
1999). These are: (1) awareness of one’s emotional state; (2) the capacity to identify
other people’s emotions; (3) the ability to use the emotional vocabulary of one’s
culture; (4) possessing the capacity to respond empathically to other people; (5) the
ability to adjust one’s emotional presentation depending on circumstances; (6) the
capacity to manage aversive emotions through a range of adaptive strategies; (7)
understanding that emotions play a critical role in establishing and maintaining
intimate relationships and being able to act on this knowledge appropriately; and (8)
the capacity for emotional self-efficacy. That is, being able to experience the kind of
emotions considered appropriate in specific situations  emotional authenticity.
Saarni argues that emotionally competent people possess enhanced self-esteem and a
considerable degree of resilience when confronted with particularly difficult problems
and situations (Saarni, 1999). The evidence from research on dynamic risk factors in
offenders indicates that offenders experience a number of problems with emotional
competence that appear to be causally related to their offending (Andrews & Bonta,
2003; Day, 2009, p. 119130, this issue; Ward et al., 2004).
The above discussion points to the significantly enhanced role of emotion in
offenders’ adaptive functioning and judgement processes if recent developments are
to be accepted. Emotion appears to be inherently evaluative, helps to integrate goal-
directed behaviour, and can be both facilitative and problematic on judgement tasks.
The limited focus that R & R puts on emotional competence addresses the disruptive
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aspects of emotion and also helps with the development of some of the emotional
competence tasks. However, its does not appear to acknowledge the important role
that emotions can play in orienting individuals to values and in the adaptive pursuit
of goals. There is also a suspicion that R & R drives a wedge between emotion and
cognition and fails to appreciate that emotions are partly cognitive in nature, and
help to create a sense of meaning and purpose in people’s lives. This occurs by virtue
of the integral link between emotions and values identification. The following two
sections on distributed cognition and embodiment directly challenge the traditional
view of autonomous cognition and emotion and suggest that offender rehabilitation
must take into account a far more holistic view of the interaction between cognition,
emotion and environment if it is to move on.
Distributed cognition
Recent work on cognition and its social scaffolding has suggested that human beings
are characterised by a number of key evolutionary and developmental features
(Gibbs, 2006; Ross, Spurrett, Kincaid, & Stephens, 2007; Sterelny, 2003). First, there
is evidence from cognitive neuropsychology and developmental psychology that our
minds are not massively modular in the way depicted by evolutionary psychology
(Buller & Hardcastle, 2000). Rather, a critical human adaptation appears to be
cognitive plasticity and the ability to learn from experience and each other (Clark,
2003); this capacity is likely to involve domain general learning mechanisms
(Griffiths & Stotz, 2000). Second, human beings actively engineer or construct their
environments by using technology and social learning, and therefore any explanation
of human characteristics will necessarily involve cultural factors, including an
understanding of the way technology assists (and extends) people’s cognitive
functioning (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). Technology can do this by way of specific
artefacts that improve aspects of our cognitive systems such as computers, books,
pen and paper, or assessment measures. Alternatively, distributing cognitive tasks
amongst social groups can enable specific individuals to specialise and thereby make
a greater contribution to the group’s cognitive performance while at the same time
benefiting from the knowledge of other members of a group. Third, our minds are
constructed throughout the process of development and are not preformed in any
meaningful sense; rather they emerge out of a matrix of developmental resources.
This means that social scaffolding by parents, peers and other social actors plays a
critical role in the development of the mind (Sterelny, 2003). Contrary to the claims
of evolutionary psychology, we do not house ancient minds within modern skulls but
rather inherit the capacity to acquire a mind (Clark, 2003). Thus the evidence
indicates that human beings’ ability to construct and in turn be shaped by their
environments(s), in conjunction with their cognitive and behavioural plasticity and
the role of culture and social learning in creating minds, means that it is a mistake to
view human nature as biologically fixed and contained inside people’s heads. Clark
(2003) noted that human beings do not have a set nature with a ‘simple wrap-around
of tools and culture; the tools and culture are as much determiners of our natures as
products of it’ (p. 86). An interesting observation is that the availability of an
externally structured learning environment makes the reliance of young organisms
on innate genetic programmes such as mental modules less essential, and in a sense,
can be seen as an external nervous system or knowledge resource (Sterelny, 2003).
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The core ideas of the above research are well summarised by Johnson in the
following passage:
‘Finally, meaning does not reside in our brain, nor does it reside in a disembodied mind.
Meaning requires a functioning brain, in a living body that engages its environments 
environments that are social and cultural, as well as physical and biological. Cultural
artefacts and practices . . . preserve aspects of meaning as objective features of the
world.’ (Johnson, 2007, p. 152).
An examination of the R & R treatment modules and their theoretical assumptions
suggests that cognition is viewed more as a property of individual minds rather than
reflecting dynamic relationships between offenders’ environments, cognitions, and
their social and personal contexts. The aim is to make offenders better decision
makers: more logical, less impulsive, more sensitive to others needs and so on. R & R
does take account of the environment to a reasonable extent in its emphasis on the
practice of skills in the wider community and on ‘helper therapy’. However, this is
often in an impoverished environment, be it in custody or when the offender is at
liberty. From the perspective of the distributed cognition hypothesis the functioning
of an individual is directly scaffolded by resources contained in the environment and
this involves an active commitment by treatment agencies and others to acknowledge
the interdependence of offenders with the rest of the community. From a
reintegration perspective this means appreciating that targeting risk factors needs
to involve other people by virtue of the fact that human beings’ cognitive and social
resources are as much external as internal. We require input from others when
appraising the cogency or rationality of our beliefs and attitudes and this means we
need to be embedded within a community that accepts us. Isolating or quarantining
offenders not only reduces the chances of having their intimacy and emotional needs
meet, it makes it less likely offence supportive beliefs and cognitions will be
effectively countered by others. In a nutshell, challenging and replacing cognitive
distortions is inherently social as well as individual in nature and process.
Furthermore, the distributed cognition thesis entails that the distinction between
environmental crime management and individual therapy is somewhat blurred and
that it is important to think in a more systematic and (from an ethical perspective)
communitarian way when intervening with offenders. But of course, there is only so
much a programme such as R & R can do to address the effect of context without
wider social and political support. In a sense, correctional interventions should be
systemic in nature and strongly social in orientation and implementation.
Embodiment of persons
The embodiment conception of human functioning has been developing over the last
15 years or so and is based on a relatively simple idea: human cognition and sense of
meaning is shaped in fundamental ways by bodily experience (Gibbs, 2006; Johnson,
2007; Rohrer, 2001). Abstract concepts such as justice, perception, language, and
rationality have recently been revealed to arise from the phenomenological
experience of bodies acting in the world rather than from a disembodied, Cartesian
mind. For example, the conceptual metaphor understanding is seeing works by
applying concepts from vision (source) to the target domain of understanding. Thus
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the object seen equates to idea, seeing an object clearly equates to understanding,
and visual focusing equates to mental attention. It is possible to extend the same
process to most abstract concepts including causation (push), life course (journey),
justice (balancing), affection (warmth), goals (destinations) and difficulties (physical
burdens). Persons are thought to be constituted out of physical material but are not
identical with it. What this means is that psychological processes emerge from
biological and neural processes but cannot be reduced to them in an explanatory
sense.
Johnson (2007, pp. 1114) has recently summarised the embodiment thesis in a
number of key theses: (a) the mind and the body are not radically separated, (b)
meaning is grounded in bodily experience, (c) reason is an embodied process  thus
there is no faculty called reason located in specific parts of the mind or brain, (d)
imagination is linked to bodily processes, (e) human beings do not have radical
freedom of the will, (f) emotion and reason are integrally linked, and (g) spirituality
is embodied and therefore rooted in our relationship to the broader world rather
than some transcendent reality.
An analysis of the R & R modules and literature supports the claim that it shares
the theoretical assumption of mainstream psychological science concerning cogni-
tion and its form. In other words, the mind, and more especially cognition and
reason, are viewed as propositional in form, distinct from the body and in some
respects the sovereign faculty. That is, meaning is thought to be based on
propositional structures expressed in language (Johnson, 2007). The embodiment
thesis takes seriously the idea that meaning can be nonverbal and derived from direct
sensory encounters with the world, most particularly the experience of emotion. The
operation of emotional and non-language-based processes can give people a sense of
meaning that is somewhat vague and non-differentiated but nevertheless real.
Language can then be used, in conjunction with people’s guiding concerns and
interests, to attend to their experiences in greater detail and articulate them via
metaphors and ultimately more abstract concepts. Thus, rationally examining
experience, perspective taking, logical analysis and so on are partly the result of
bodily processes working in concert and not simply due to language dependent
logical or rational analysis. Certainly, embodiment researchers accept that language
is critical in specifying meaning and communicating ideas but assert that the building
blocks of our search for identity and purpose in the world are socially mediated
forms of embodiment. R & R’s overarching emphasis on problem-solving and
cognition as independent from environments, somatic perception and emotion limits
the degree to which it can truly change the experience of the offender in a more
holistic way and promote more prosocial interaction with his or her world.
Implications
In this paper we have evaluated the theoretical assumptions underpinning R & R in
light of four current lines of research evident in contemporary neuroscience and
psychology: rationality, emotion, distributed cognition, and embodiment. Overall,
we concluded that the theory underpinning the R & R treatment modules could be
refined and reworked to better reflect some of the exciting work now being done on
cognition. It now remains to briefly consider how this might occur, and to what
degree. A way of structuring the implications of the above analysis is to briefly focus
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on answering two questions, (a) What do these theoretical insights and research
findings really mean?, and (b) What implications might the findings have for R & R
and cognitive skills programmes in general?
Key theoretical insights and their meaning
The research and theoretical innovations surveyed above all point to a need to
conceptualise cognition in a contextualised and embodied way and the picture of
rationality (and cognition) that emerges is that of human beings as practical
reasoners: physically constituted organisms who actively construct goals and modify
themselves and their environment in order to realise them. The environment contains
social, cultural, biological, and physical resources and the mind extends to artefacts
and external structures that contain information relevant to goal achievement.
Emotions are integrated with cognition and arise from individuals’ fundamental
commitments and needs and point them to salient aspects of the environment
that are likely to hinder or facilitate goal achievement. Moreover, emotions motivate
people by providing feedback on the degree to which they are successful in
implementing their plans and also contribute to the experience of meaning.
Furthermore, because of their embodiment, events that threaten the physical
integrity of individuals also adversely influence their psychological and social
functioning. For example, inadequate food, crowded environments, polluted water,
extreme levels of noise, and unhygienic living conditions may result in impaired brain
and physical functioning and therefore emotional and cognitive functional decre-
ments. From this perspective, values refer to physical, biological, social and cultural
conditions that enhance individual’s functioning and enable them to develop their
capacities to a significant degree (Kraut, 2007).
Implications for R & R programmes and offender treatment
The integrated nature of human beings means that access to specific goods or
experiences usually demands the possession of a much wider range of coordinated
skills. For example, access to epistemic (i.e. knowledge generating) resources such as
the opinions and ideas of other people necessitates the possession of social skills,
otherwise opportunities for obtaining the perspectives of others are likely to be few
and far between. In other words, practitioners need to equip individuals with the
skills required to get access to key resources alongside the utilisation of the resources
themselves. A problem with R & R type approaches is that they appear to imply that
offender competencies are modularised in the same way as programmes. The danger
with this way of approaching treatment is that it is easy to fracture offenders into
packets of discrete components and forget that they are whole persons seeking to live
relatively unified lives (Ward & Maruna, 2007).
The various components of R & R type programmes can be viewed as providing
the internal and external conditions required for offenders to become effective
practical decision makers. Each component can be understood as addressing a core
set of skills designed to help offenders formulate important life goals and to
successfully implement plans that contain them. Practitioners should formulate
individual rehabilitation plans for offenders that identifies and coordinates their
important goals and specifies the skills and resources required to achieve them.
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Conceptualising R & R in these terms makes it easier to knit together its components
to reflect the above research on cognition and embodiment. A possible way of fine
tuning R & R is as follows:
. Self-control: deals with some aspects of emotional competence and the basic
requirements of agency. Self-control skills are best taught within the context of
better lives plans that systematically outline individuals’ goals and specify how
the competencies contained in other modules can be facilitated, or are in turn
strengthened, by such skills.
. Meta-cognition: directly concerned with helping offenders to think reflectively
about their experiences, lives, goals, and the contexts in which they live. The
core construct is that of the offender as a practical decision maker who is
seeking to fashion a better life through the identification of worthwhile goals
and effective means of realising them in certain environments.
. Social skills and interpersonal problem-solving skills: enables offenders to deal
effectively with the interpersonal contexts in which they pursue their own goals
and also to seek relatedness goods. Being able to rationally reflect on and
arrive at adaptive beliefs requires sound social and interpersonal problem
solving skills; as well as emotional competency, good physical health, and so
on.
. Creative thinking: will aid offenders to imagine novel ways of understanding
their lives and their possible futures by way of conceptual metaphors and
aesthetic experiences.
. Critical reasoning: will involve evaluation of primary values or final ends,
evidence for beliefs, consistency of arguments, and efficient means to achieve
coordinated goals (in form of plans). Emotions will also be viewed as sources
of meaning and evaluation that are more holistic and intuitive but nevertheless
valuable sources of information about the self and the world
. Emotional management: will be integrated with the above module but in
addition stress the full range of emotional competencies and the role of
emotion in judgement and creation of meaning and detection of values
. Helper therapy and values enhancement: will cover the full range of prudential
and epistemic (knowledge generating) values and be integrated with above
modules. Ethics will be viewed as involving a need for coordination of agents’
life plans. The fact that embodiment points to interdependency of people will
help with the egocentricity issue.
. Social perspective taking: conflicts between people will be addressed by
focusing on the values involved and the different ways of understanding
situations. Thus will take in account emotion, interdependency and the need to
coordinate plans and hence cooperate.
On a final note, the fact that many offenders suffer from learning difficulties and
cognitive problems of various kinds does not invalidate the concept of practical
reasoning or the relevance of programmes such as R & R. All individuals have goals
and attempt to realise them in ways that are thought to be efficient and likely to
bring success. The challenge when working with offenders who are intellectually
disabled or have learning difficulties is to take into account their specific problems
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when delivering interventions; in other words, to attend to their responsivity needs
(Andrews & Bonta, 2003).
Conclusions
In this paper we have briefly described the R & R cognitive skills programme and
evaluated the theoretical assumptions about cognition, values, emotions, and human
functioning that appear to underpin its treatment modules. We found that recent
work on rationality, emotion, distributed cognition, and embodiment introduced
some useful and new ways of understanding the relationship between cognitive skills
and action. We proposed that the concept of practical reasoning can provide a richer
theoretical foundation for R & R and also help to modify the ways in which it is
delivered to better reflect contemporary cognitive research.
It is worth bearing in mind that R & R facilitated a major step forward some
20 years ago concerning how we thought about offender rehabilitation and
justifiably had a massive impact on correctional interventions. Literally thousands
of offenders have undergone R & R treatment programmes and their derivatives
around the world since the late 1980s (Antonowicz, 2005). However, the richness of
the research developments discussed in this paper regarding cognition and emotion,
coupled with the rather equivocal findings from R & R-based outcome evaluations
in recent years (e.g. Cann, 2006; Falshaw, Friendship, Travers, & Nugent, 2003;
Wilkinson, 2005), suggest that serious consideration of these new insights could
serve us well in our pursuit of offender rehabilitation and potentially further increase
its therapeutic utility.
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